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It is clear that within Deleuze and Whitehead’s work, there is an important re-
description of the time, place and status of all subjectivity, a subjectivity which is 
not limited to the ‘human’.  Both writers provide compelling reasons as to why, 
and how, contemporary analyses should avoid positing the human person as 
either an object or a subject.  Rather, ‘human’ individuality is to be envisaged as 
an aspect within the wider, processual effectivity whereby the virtual becomes 
actual (Deleuze), or the solidarity of the extensive continuum becomes actualized 
into individuality (Whitehead).   It may appear that I am eliding or confusing the 
distinction between subjectivity and individuality here.  However, one of the 
arguments that I wish to set out in this chapter is that the validity and complexity 
of such a distinction can be helpfully re-thought through a sustained engagement 
with the work of Whitehead and Deleuze. 
 
Broadly speaking, the invitation is to analyse those processes by which 
subjectivity and matter conspire to instantiate actuality.  Neither subjectivity (nor 
individuality) are simple effects of former processes nor are they it creative forces 
in themselves.  For both Whitehead and Deleuze, enduring ‘objects’, insofar as 
they are substantial items of existence, are ‘persons’.  For Whitehead: “Societies 
of the general type, that their realized nexūs are purely temporal and continuous, 
will be termed ‘personal’.” (Whitehead, 1967, p. 205).  Further: “a dog is a 
‘person’” (Whitehead, 1967, p. 206).  As long as it is remembered that such 
persons (or objects) are not self-identical, self-sufficient, Newtonian entities.  
Deleuze puts it thus: 
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 All objects = x are ‘persons’ and are defined by predicates.  But these are no 
longer the analytic predicates of individuals determined within a world which 
carries out the description of these individuals.  On the contrary, they are 
predicates which define persons synthetically, and open different worlds and 
individualities to them as so many variables or possibilities. (Deleuze, 1990, p. 
115). 
 
So, as stated above, both Whitehead and Deleuze have very specific conceptions 
of that which constitutes individuality.  Further, they insist that to render 
humans as the only mode of personhood is to falsely render the processual 
character of the universe.   But as this Deleuze quote above suggests, something 
of language or the linguistic (through the ‘predicate’) will also be implicated in 
this.  And it is this that I wish to approach in this chapter. 
 
Whitehead on Language 
 
Although Whitehead does not develop a specific theory of language within his 
work, there are four points that I would like to raise with regard to the place and 
status of language and the linguistic within his writing. 
 
Firstly, toward the end of his first detailed discussion of his own version of 
propositions within Process and Reality, Whitehead uses examples of ‘verbal’ 
propositions to illustrate his point concerning how “the actual world...enters into 
each proposition” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 194)  For, of the (‘linguistic’) proposition 
“‘Caesar has crossed the Rubicon’” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 195), Whitehead states: 
“this form of words symbolizes an indefinite number of diverse propositions.”  
That is, if uttered roughly two thousand and fifty one years ago, ‘Caesar’ would 
have referred to a contemporary structured society and ‘Rubicon’ to a 
contemporary society which were in the actual world of both the person who 
made the statement and the person for whom the proposition was an element to 
be judged. 
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Or: 
one of Caesar’s old soldiers may in later years have sat on the bank of the river 
and meditated on the assassination of Caesar, and on Caesar’s passage over the 
little river tranquilly flowing before his gaze.  This would have been a different 
proposition (Whitehead, 1978, p. 196).  
 
His conclusion is that “Nothing could better illustrate the hopeless ambiguity of 
language since both propositions could fit the same verbal phraseology” 
(Whitehead, 1978, p. 196).  Whitehead then goes on to list other possible 
propositions to which such a verbal statement could refer.  And his general 
conclusion is that he has demonstrated “the futility of taking any verbal 
statement...and arguing about the meaning” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 196). 
 
Second, Whitehead is also keen to distinguish between language and 
‘philosophical’ propositions.  So, once again, he states that:  “Language is 
thoroughly indeterminate, by reason of the fact that every occurrence 
presupposes some systematic type of environment” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 12).  
This statement, made early on in Process and Reality, establishes the core of 
Whitehead’s attitude towards language.  However, at this point of the argument 
he is discussing ‘propositions’ as usually understood within philosophy, for 
example, ‘Socrates is mortal’.  He does not believe that such propositions 
immediately represent, express or correspond to the facticity of the world.  
However, the reason why he does not believe this is of some importance; it is 
because every ‘occurrence’, i.e. actual entity or event, in itself, can only be 
understood in relation to the environment from which it proceeds.  So:  “A 
proposition can embody partial truth because it only demands a certain type of 
systematic environment, which is presupposed in its meaning.  It does not refer 
to the universe in all its detail” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 11).  However, this does 
provide a first indication of the manner in which Whitehead envisages language 
or the linguistic as implicit in existence.   
 
Third, although Whitehead does not discuss the materiality of the signifier in 
relation to language and propositions, he nevertheless insists on the physical 
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manner in which vocal language is encountered.  In this sense, spoken language 
is an aspect of the ‘withness of the body’, although Whitehead does not put it in 
these terms.  Rather he states that: 
 
A single word is not one definite sound.  Every instance of its utterance differs in 
some respect from every other instance: the pitch of the voice, the intonation, the 
accent, the quality of the sound, the rhythmic relations of the components 
sounds, the intensity of the sound all vary.  Thus a word is a species of sounds, 
with specific identity and individual differences. (Whitehead, 1978, p. 182). 
 
So, like actual entities themselves, words are different amongst themselves but 
they also obtain a level of ‘identity’.  Hence: “the meaning of the word...[is]...an 
event” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 182).  This tantalising reference to the relation 
between language and events is not developed by Whitehead but is by Deleuze, 
especially in The Logic of Sense (and it a reading of this which will make up much 
of the development of this chapter).  For, Whitehead does not develop a specific 
theory of such linguistic events; they are simply, qua events, another 
manifestation of the eventfulness of the universe.   
 
It would seem, on this analysis, that Whitehead understands meaning as cohering 
within individual words.  But this is not the case.  Meaning comes not from 
individual words but from their locus within a wider linguistic environment.  But 
this does not explain the means by which language functions as a communicative 
device, within Whitehead’s more general understanding of process.  In order to 
accomplish this, Whitehead describes language in terms of symbolism.i
 
Four: “A word is a symbol” (Whitehead, 1928, p. 12)  (Whitehead says).  This 
seems clear enough; but such a statement begs the question; “why do we say that 
the word ‘tree’ - spoken or written - is a symbol to us for trees?” (Whitehead, 
1928, p. 13).  Given Whitehead’s previous refusal of the subject/object division 
and his rigorous attempts to avoid any notion of ‘primary substance’, this is likely 
also to be found in his work on symbols and symbolism. 
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So he distances his version of symbolism from those which predicate a world of 
distinct objects and subjects in the following way:  “Both the word itself and trees 
themselves enter into our experience on equal terms” (Whitehead, 1928, p. 13).  
Whitehead thereby retains the democratic element of his general theory of 
becoming and hence the principle of univocity.  In this sense “it would be 
sensible...for trees to symbolize the word ‘tree’ as for the word to symbolize the 
trees” (Whitehead, 1928, p. 13).  The difficulty is in explaining quite what the role 
of symbolism is.  If Whitehead is simply reasserting the primacy of the inter-
relation of items of matter within his philosophy, then symbolism, as a way of 
explaining the precise role of language, has lost its purchase.  That is to say, 
Whitehead is quite clear that:  “Language itself is a symbolism” (Whitehead, 
1928, p. 73).  The importance here being upon the word ‘a’.  Language is an 
example of the wider mode of symbolism. 
 
Thus, although language is not of interest in itself, for Whitehead, it should be 
noted that his later account of human consciousness is phrased in terms which 
resonate with a theory of language or of components of the linguistic within 
existence.  For example, he writes: “all forms of consciousness arise from ways of 
integration of propositional feelings” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 256) and, ultimately, 
such propositional feelings rely on the dual terms of “‘logical subjects of the 
proposition’...and the ‘predicates of the proposition’” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 186).  
 
So, Whitehead has an implicit rather than an explicit conception of the role of the 
linguistic within existence but it is one that can be drawn out through a 
comparison with the work of Deleuze.  And, further, such a reading can develop 
novel approaches to thinking about subjectivity, human individuality, materiality 
and actualization.   
 
Deleuze on Language  
 
Deleuze argues that language itself is intimately tied up with becoming and 
materiality.  More particularly, it is ‘sense’ which becomes the most important 
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element in the discussion of the relation of bodies, states of affairs, events and 
language.  So it is the question ‘What is sense?’, that needs to be focussed upon.  
 
Deleuze would make no simple reply, but his position could be summed up as 
follows: 
Sense is both the expressible or the expressed of the proposition, and the 
attribute of the state of affairs.  It turns one side towards things and one side 
towards propositions.  But it does not merge with the propositions which it 
expresses any more than with the state of affairs or the quality which the 
proposition denotes. (Deleuze, 1990, p. 22). 
 
Deleuze is using the term ‘sense’ in a very specific way here.  Sense is that which 
forms the boundary between things and words but is reducible to neither. 
 
Deleuze’s makes the point that there is nothing about theories of truth, when 
dealing with the relationship between words and things, that makes them able to 
explain the sense which inheres propositions, be they true or false.  Any theory of 
the conditions of truth must contain “contain something unconditioned” 
(Delezue, 1990, p. 19) which enables the three relations of the proposition to 
subsist.  There must be a fourth relation of the proposition.  And this 
unconditioned something, this fourth relation is ‘sense’.  In keeping with his 
wider philosophical outlook, that which comprises such an ‘unconditioned 
something’ cannot exist in itself as substantial, for then it would either exist as an 
individual and, therefore, would be limited in its ability to operate, as 
individuality is a temporary effect of the mixing of bodies.  But nor can sense be 
purely conceptual, it cannot be an abstract idea which forms and informs the 
world as, according Deleuze, such ideas are effects rather than causes.  Instead: 
 
Sense is the fourth dimension of the proposition.  The Stoics discovered it along 
with the event: sense: the expressed of the proposition, is an incorporeal, 
complex and irreducible entity, at the surface of things, a pure event which 
inheres or subsists in the proposition. (Deleuze, 1990, p. 19).  
 
Sense is ‘the expressed of the proposition’.  It is not what the proposition 
expresses; it is not limited to the proposition.  If it were then sense would remain 
within the circle of the proposition and would have to be explained in terms of 
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denotation, manifestation or signification.  At the same time, sense is not a 
simple property of things as they are.  Finally, sense is not reducible to the 
perceptions or judgements of subjects confronted either by propositions or 
things.  Sense as “that which is expressed by the proposition...[is] irreducible to 
individual states of affairs, particular images, personal beliefs, and universal or 
general concepts” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 19). 
 
Deleuze then comments on the difficulty of this notion.  “It is difficult to respond 
to those who wish to be satisfied with words, things, images and ideas” (Deleuze, 
1990, p. 20)  Sense does not ‘exist’, with regard to Deleuze’s understanding of the 
conditions of existence.  “For we may not even say that sense exists either in 
things or in the mind; it has neither physical nor mental existence” (Deleuze, 
1990, p. 20).  Furthermore, sense is something that cannot be grasped nor can it 
be named as such: “in fact we can only infer it indirectly” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 20).  
And it is this final statement which provides the best clue as to how an 
understanding of ‘sense’ can be furthered with reference to Whitehead.  
According to Whitehead, that which cannot be named, that which only exists 
insofar as it partakes of other things, that which is never encountered but must be 
inferred from the stubborn facts of experience, is an eternal object.  It is not 
eternal objects as expressions of potentiality that are being alluded to here but 
eternal objects in their role as that which provides definiteness to the experience 
of becoming a subject.  Deleuze’s usage of the term ‘sense’ could be seen as a way 
of explaining what goes on in such occurrences.  Indeed, it could be argued that 
Deleuze’s notion of sense is a development of the notion of the term ‘event’ which 
Whitehead used in his early work but which he moved away from in Process and 
Reality.  For sense is that which accompanies an event, in that it describes not 
how the subject makes sense of the world but how the world makes sense.  It is 
this process of ‘making sense’ (or, perhaps, ‘constructing’ sense) that enables the 
creation and completion of subjects and individuals.  That is to say, the world 
creates (or constructs) sense as an effect of the inter-relation of singularities 
within the virtual.  Given that all subjects are part of this world they are also 
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created within such creativity.  And this is precisely Whitehead’s point in his 
critique of Kant: 
 
Thus for Kant the process whereby there is experience is a process from 
subjectivity to apparent objectivity.  The philosophy of organism inverts this 
analysis, and explains the process as proceeding from objectivity to subjectivity, 
namely, from the objectivity, whereby the external world is a datum, to the 
subjectivity, whereby there is one individual experience. (Whitehead, 1978, p. 
156).  
 
For the moment, with Deleuze, it is the tracking down and unfolding of 
experience which is of interest (as it is throughout Process and Reality).  And 
Deleuze’s hunt starts with the Husserlian notion of the ‘noema’: 
 
when Husserl reflects on the ‘perceptual noema,’ or the ‘sense of perception,’ he 
at once distinguishes it from the physical object, from the psychological or ‘lived,’ 
from mental representations and from logical concepts.  He presents it as an 
impassive and incorporeal entity, without physical or mental existence, neither 
acting nor being acted upon - a pure result or pure ‘appearance.’ (Deleuze, 1990, 
p. 20). 
 
In Whitehead’s terms, settled actual entities have objective existence, as opposed 
to the formal existence of the entity which prehends that object as part of its 
becoming constituted as an entity.ii  So, ‘perceptual noema’ or ‘the sense of 
perception’ could be seen as referring to the immediate process of the combining 
of prehensions within an actual entity or subject, in its genetic phase (Whitehead, 
1978, p. 283); that is, in its becoming (i.e. before it has become).  This is a 
description of the very moment or moments (which are not yet in time) of the 
sub-representativeiii creation of individuality which neither relies on nor 
proceeds from an individual. 
 
So, noema are not the passive reception or perception of static objects; they are 
not ‘given’ in the traditional sense.  Rather, the noema constitute ‘an ideational 
objective unity’.  This relates to Whitehead’s notion of the act of experience of an 
entity, comprised through the combining of elements into a unity; where such 
elements do not immediately correspond to perception.  Noema are that which 
are somehow related to the objective existence of objects but are also distinct 
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from them.  “We distinguish between green as a sensible color [sic] or quality and 
‘to green’ as a noematic color [sic] or attribute.  ‘The tree greens’. (Deleuze: 1990, 
p. 21)  Whitehead puts it in the following way:  “the prehension of a sensum, as an 
apparent object qualifying a region, involve[s]...for that prehension a subjective 
form also involving that sensum as a factor.  We enjoy the green foliage of 
the spring greenly” (Whitehead, 1967, pp. 250-1.  Emphasis added).  Or, as the 
poet Andrew Marvell puts it in The Garden:  ‘Annihilating all that’s made, 
 
       To a green Thought in a green Shade’ (Marvell, 1972, p. 257) . 
 
Both Whitehead and Deleuze are attempting to describe how subjects or 
individuals occur amidst their non-essential ontological multiplicities, in a way 
that allows for the world to be received, and for sense to be made, without relying 
primarily on visual perception.  This is the role of ‘sense’ in Deleuze; it is not 
something that the subject confers on the world rather it is something that is 
created; the world makes sense:  “‘The tree greens’ - is this not finally the sense of 
the color [sic] of the tree...?” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 21).    However, it is not simply 
that the world is sense, or that the world is sensible and all that is required is the 
proper rendition of its given elements to produce subjectivity.  It is the complex 
relation of sense to language and events which Deleuze uses to preclude such 
determinacy.iv
 
Sense is indeed attributed, but it is not at all the attribute of the proposition - it is 
rather the attribute of the thing or state of affairs.  The attribute of the 
proposition is the predicate - a qualitative predicate like green for example.  It is 
attributed to the subject of the proposition.  But the attribute of the thing is the 
verb: to green, or rather the event expressed by this verb....’Green’ designates a 
quality, a mixture of things, a mixture of tree and air where chlorophyll coexists 
with all parts of the leaf.  ‘To green,’ on the other contrary, is not a quality in the 
thing, but an attribute which is said of the thing.  This attribute does not exist 
outside of the proposition which expresses it in denoting the thing. (Deleuze, 
1990, p.  21). 
 
Once again:  ‘Sense is the expressed of the proposition’.   
 
 9
For Deleuze, sense does not exist, as such, as it only occurs through its expression 
(‘what is expressed does not exist outside its expression’).  This is not to say that 
sense is an attribute of a proposition (‘what is expressed has no resemblance 
whatsoever to the expression’.  Usually, trees are said to be green.  They are seen 
to be static objects which have certain essential properties which define what they 
are; one of these properties is that they are green.  In such accounts, trees are 
passive, enduring entities which are perceived or talked about by subjects which 
are independent of them.  As has been seen, both Whitehead and Deleuze are 
sharply opposed to such approaches.  Instead they both emphasise the processual 
aspect of reality, the primacy of bodily relations, and the individual moments 
whereby actuality arises out of this more general field.  Thus ‘greenness’ is not a 
static property, rather, it is an active element which expresses the constitution of 
each specific tree (‘the attribute of the thing [or state of affairs] is the verb’: ‘to 
green, or rather the event expressed by this verb’).  Deleuze thus ‘agrees’ with 
Whitehead that there are subjects of propositions (logical sets of actual entities) 
and that these are surrounded by a range of predicates (complex eternal objects).  
Where he is, perhaps, clearer than Whitehead is in associating such predicates 
with the linguistic through his positing of verbs as elemental.  It is not that 
Deleuze envisages language as the harbinger of existence, rather, that the notion 
of the verb best evokes the activity which comprises the real existence of the 
world.  This is the germ of the relationship of language or the linguistic, 
subjectivity and individuality that I wish to draw out here. 
 
As stated earlier, it should be noted that early on in his philosophical career, 
Whitehead too, attempted to use parts of speech as elements within the facticity 
of the universe, for example: “It is an adjective of events which to some extent 
conditions the possibilities of apparent sense-objects” (Whitehead, 1922, p. 34).  
And, Whitehead’s theory of propositions does coincide, at points, with Deleuze’s 
view of the world in terms of activity, and events as quasi-effects of the prior 
mixture of bodies and qualities (logical sets of actual entities and predicates - in 
terms of complex eternal objects).  However, for Deleuze, it is verbs that express 
the activity of the universe; this activity is reducible neither to subjects nor 
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objects, for both are involved within and yet escape the formation of sense.  
‘Green’ or the greenness of a tree is one thing; it is the mixing of bodies, it is a 
state of affairs.  ‘To green’, the activity or expression of greenness is not inherent 
in such a state of affairs, it is not an essential property of a thing.  Instead, ‘To 
green...is said of the thing.’ 
 
So, the thing does not say ‘I am green so perceive me as green or assert that I am 
green.’  The greening of a tree is ‘said of the thing’.  But it is not said by a subject.  
In fact it is not said by anyone.  It should be noted that Deleuze uses the passive 
tense here.  However, insofar, as such an attribute ‘does not exist outside of the 
proposition which expresses it’, then it must be expressed.  This is closely tied to 
Deleuze’s usage of the ‘univocity of being’ where “Being is said in a single and 
same sense...of all its individuating differences” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 36).  Thus 
being is ‘spoken’ in that it enacts sense.  But this is not a unified sense; for within 
the very instantiation of being is that which creates difference.  Given that there 
are no universal concepts or propositions, Deleuze is arguing that each moment 
of being is accompanied by a proposition.  These are not verbal propositions but, 
at the same time, each becoming does entail that some position is taken with 
regard to the world or state of affairs; and such positioning is implicated in what 
has been called a ‘statement’.v  It is the making of this statement, which is the 
making of sense, which itself produces the subject and enables the designation of 
an ‘exterior’ world after the event (that is, the possibility of signification, 
denotation and manifestation come after the event and sense).  In reality (i.e. in 
terms of becoming), sense, propositions, attributes, events and their relation to 
verbs are not strictly separate.  But, as with Whitehead’s analysis of the 
combination of prehensions into a substantial entity, it is possible, after the event 
to analyse or divide that which is not in itself divided; “the region is, after all, 
divisible, although in the genetic growth it is undivided” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 
284). 
 
However, it should be noted that it is not specific verbs, or the ‘meaning’ of verbs, 
which is of interest to Deleuze.  Instead, Deleuze isolates two distinct aspects of 
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the verb.  There is “the present, which indicates its relation to a denotable state of 
affairs” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 184).  Under this aspect falls the triad of denotation, 
manifestation and signification which form “the aggregate of times, persons, and 
modes” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 184).  The other aspect is “the infinitive, which 
indicates its relation to sense or the event in view of the internal time which it 
envelops” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 184).  Under this aspect falls the range of 
potentiality which each specific occurrence of that verb relies on for its sense.  
But, the sense of the verb is not exhausted by these occurrences, it retains it own 
indeterminate form.  “The Verb is the univocity of language, in the form of an 
undetermined infinitive, without person, without present, without any diversity 
of voice” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 185).  Thus, the verb replicates the role of eternal 
objects in Whitehead’s work.  It will be remembered that eternal objects express 
the infinite potentiality which permeates the universe through its ongoing 
creative process.  In this way they are eternal, out of time, in that they are not 
determined by, or limited to, the present .  As such, they link the past and the 
future.  For Deleuze, “The pure infinitive...permits no distinction of moments, but 
goes on being divided formally in the double and simultaneous direction of the 
past and future” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 185). 
 
Yet, one of the main roles of eternal objects is to ingress in the becoming of actual 
entities.  In Deleuze’s reading of Whitehead: “eternal objects are...pure 
Virtualities that are actualized in prehensions” (Deleuze, 1993, p. 79).  It is only 
because of such ingressions that definiteness is granted to actual entities, to 
individuals.  Thus, under the first aspect of Deleuze’s version of the verb, (‘its 
relation to a denotable state of affairs’) are created ‘times, persons, and modes’; 
that is, the present with all its punctuations of time, space and individuals.  
Unlike Whitehead, Deleuze thus views language, in the form of the verb, as 
integral to the formations of (human) individuals.  This is not language as an 
epiphenomenon, or supplementary explanatory device, or creation of the human 
‘subject’.  Language is coextensive with becoming, with the event, with the 
creation of sense itself.  Further, language is not solely a human affair, it is not 
reducible to a ‘cultural intelligible’.  On Deleuze’s account, the verb “inherits...the 
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communication of events among themselves” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 185).  The 
universe is not “shivered into a multitude of disconnected substantial 
things....[where] substantial thing cannot call unto substantial thing” 
(Whitehead, 1967, p. 133)  - as Whitehead puts it.  Instead, language, sense, and 
events are all interconnected effects of the mixing of bodies which do thereby 
communicate with each other.  Language is not to be seen as words here, rather it 
is a mode of inter-action which is an integral element of the coming to be of all 
items of existence.  Language does not represent, reflect or create, states of 
affairs, it is made possible by them and expresses particular actualities and 
delimits them.  “It is language which fixes the limits” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 2).  And it 
is here that we move onto the notion of language and individuality more directly.  
Language  keeps singularities and actualities in touch with the infinite, with the 
unbridled process of becoming: “it is language as well which transcends the limits 
and restores them to the infinite equivalence of an unlimited becoming” 
(Deleuze, 1990, p. 3).  Language does not make (create) sense; it is only one 
element in the process in which individuals become actualised, their sense 
created, and whereby events occur.  “As it expresses in language all events in one, 
the infinite verb expresses the event of language - language being a unique event 
which merges now with that which renders it possible” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 185).  
So, describing the verb as infinite is a philosophical device.  It is an abstract 
characterization of the universe in terms of process and becoming.  But the verb 
is also implicated in the ‘present’, in the actualization of individuals; it is 
important to recognize this distinction, that is, to accept the force of the 
philosophical approach, but then to delineate the operations of such infinitive 
verbs in their present and personalizing actualizations.  It is also important to 
note a distinction between Deleuze and Whitehead at this point, even though this 
might turn out to be no more that a terminological one. 
 
Subjectivity, Individuality and Language 
 
For Whitehead, subjectivity is superjectivity, that is, it is the combination of 
diverse elements into one unity.  It is the process of this concrescence that 
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constitute its ‘formal’ existence.  Once it has become, it perishes, it becomes a 
datum for other becomings.  This is its ‘objective’ existence whereby it gains its 
immortality (Whitehead, 1978, p. 219-220).  Whitehead emphasizes the 
processual aspect of becoming and hence the formal aspect of existence.  Deleuze, 
on the other hand distinguishes between that form of subjectivity which is ‘real’, 
which exists, but within the realm of singularities.  As Ansell-Pearson puts it: 
“subjectivity is never ours but always virtual” (Ansell Pearson, 2002, p. 168).  
Thus the present, or the ‘world-as-it-is’ is populated not by subjectivities but by 
individuals which are actualized out of the virtual.  Such actualized individuals 
are also ‘real’, they are as real as the virtual.  However, they are in some way 
delimited or controlled; they are the implicated in the operations of force or 
power.  Clearly Whitehead does not view the shift from formal to objective 
existence in precisely these terms.  However, it would seem possible to equate his 
distinction between these modes of existence to Deleuze’s notions of virtual 
subjectivity and actual individuals. 
 
So, it has been seen how Deleuze introduces language into his ontology through 
an analysis of the status of the verb as infinite.  It was also pointed out that this is 
only half the story, in that the verb is also implicated in the actualizations of the 
present.  Deleuze elaborates this second point by building on the work of 
Foucault (Deleuze, 1988) (though he goes beyond him very quickly).  In doing so, 
he makes use of the term ‘statements’. 
 
Statements are not produced by individual speakers or subjects; they do not 
harbour the intentionality or creativity of individual humans; “no originality is 
needed in order to produce them” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 3).  On Deleuze’s reading, 
statements inhabit the realm of the already decided, of the real (in the sense of 
the actual).  Statements will delimit the utter facticity of the moment within 
which subjects find their place; they are, in this sense, ‘social’ insofar as they 
substantiate the actual conditions and consequences of the contemporary world.  
Hence, they are also resolutely implicated in the material. 
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 Statements are not purely linguistic.  They imply and require, for their operation, 
“the complementary space of non-discursive formations” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 9).   
Deleuze identifies such formations in relation to institutions.vi  For: 
 
Any institution implies the existence of statements such as a constitution, a 
charter, contracts, registrations and enrolments.  Conversely, statements refer 
back to an institutional milieu which is necessary for the formation both of the 
objects which arise in such examples of the statements and of the subject who 
speaks from this position (for example the position of the writer in society, the 
position of the doctor in the hospital or at his [sic] surgery, in any given period 
together with the new emergence of objects.) (Deleuze, 1988, p. 9). 
 
If medical discourse is derived from a relation of statements which enables it to 
talk intelligibly about specific objects, and employ specific practices, then one 
example of the non-discursive, the visible, might be the hospital considered as an 
architectural entity.  However, this is not to consider the hospital as a Newtonian, 
physical object, for:  “they [hospitals] are not just figures of stone, assemblages of 
things...but first and foremost forms of light that distribute light and dark, 
opaque and transparent, seen and non-seen, etc.” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 57). 
 
So, Deleuze uses the terms ‘the articulable and the visible’ to distinguish and to 
link the realms of the discursive and the non-discursive. In some respects, the 
articulable and the visible are analogous but they are not isomorphic.  It is, 
perhaps, Whitehead’s work which can best elucidate these terms and their inter-
relation.  At the metaphysical level, every actual entity is “dipolar, with its 
physical and mental poles” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 239).  This ‘mental’ aspect does 
not refer to the psychological or to consciousness as originary.  Rather, it refers to 
the conceptual as that potential which is instantiated within all items of being or 
matter; this is what grants all materiality its subjectivity.  This account therefore 
avoids envisaging the universe as replete with simple, inert objects, only 
occasionally punctuated with the searing light of human subjectivity.  
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So, consistent with Whitehead’s insistence on the priority of becoming over being 
and his epochal theory of time (and space), it is the pulse of becoming which 
creates time and space; so to speak of relations within such becomings is to pre-
empt actuality.  The visible and the articulable do not exist within time and space, 
they create it.  And this goes for the hospitals, prisons and so on, which literallyvii 
fabricate their own spatio-temporal systems.   
 
However, Deleuze (and Whitehead) would not want to over-emphasize the heavy, 
stratified, domains of discourse and institution (the articulable and the visible), 
or the rigidity of such institutions and the final completion of each bounded 
creation (or subject).  The co-workings of power and knowledge do not 
completely render their material as subject, or object, so that there is nothing 
beyond or left over.   
 
Conclusion: Language, Individuality and Materiality 
 
For Deleuze, human language is not creative in any originary sense and nor is it 
unique.  “Events make language possible” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 181).  Human 
language is only one of the elements within the constitution of humans as 
individuals.  It is the realm of sense which informs and surrounds such 
temporary individuality, and proscribes the events within which they occur.  
There are other diverse languages: “There is even a white society and a white 
language, the latter being that which contains in its virtuality all the phonemes 
and relations destined to be actualised in diverse languages” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 
206).  Such languages are not limited to humans as they can arise from the 
communication of non-human singularities.  This notion builds upon 
Whitehead’s assessment of eternal objects as those potentials which inform the 
creation and definiteness of all subjects.  A white stone is not only white because 
human language calls it white.  It is white because whiteness is one of the 
defining elements of its becoming.  It feel itself to be white.  Whitehead’s choice 
of colours as his preferred method of explaining the role of eternal objects takes 
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on renewed importance with Deleuze’s analysis.  Deleuze is also clear in linking 
colour, matter and subjectivity: 
 
Included in the notion as subject is forever an event marked by a verb, or a 
relation marked by a preposition...(and if things had the gift of speech, they 
would say, as might, for example, gold: ‘I will resist melting and nitric acid’). 
(Deleuze, 1993, p. 52). 
 
Or, as Whitehead puts it, quoting Locke: “Thus we say, fire has a power to melt 
gold;...and gold has a power to be melted” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 57).viii  Thus 
subjectivity or individuality is not solely a human affair.  And the actualization of 
individuals is not entirely separate from the singularities which enable 
actualization: “singularities are actualized both in a world and in the individuals 
which are parts of the world” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 110).  In ‘fact’, in actuality, each 
individual entity is presented with its own world, its own history, its own 
grouping of singularities or objectified entities as it is “somewhere in the 
continuum, and arises out of the data provided by this standpoint” (Whitehead, 
1978, p. 67).  And with regard to the body, this entails, as Deleuze puts it, that: 
 
In each world, the individuals express all the singularities of this world - an 
infinity -...but each monad envelops or expresses ‘clearly’ a certain number of 
singularities only, that is, those in the vicinity of which it is constituted and 
which link up with its own body. (Deleuze, 1990, p. 111).    
 
With which Whitehead concurs: 
 
the animal body is nothing more than the most intimately relevant part of the 
antecedent settled world. (Whitehead, 1978, p. 64). 
 
Thus, it is possible to view Deleuze as a continuation of Whitehead’s project.  As 
he and Guattari state of his philosophy of organism: “Interaction becomes 
communication” (Deleuze, and Guattari, 1994, p. 154).  Hence, it is possible to 
outline an approach which includes ‘nature’ (in the sense of the physical world of 
the natural sciences and philosophy) as a cohesive and yet infinite milieu within 
which individuality and subjectivity are not simple constructions, representations 
or epi-phenomena.  Instead, they comprise the limited, physical and social 
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actuality of the ‘world-as-it-is’ but do not fully exemplify, incarnate or exhaust its 
potentiality. 
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i  See, Whitehead, 1978: 168-183, and Whitehead, 1928, Symbolism.  Its Meaning and 
Effect, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge  
ii  See, Whitehead 1978: 219-220 
iii  “Anyhow ‘representative perception’ can never, within its own metaphysical doctrines, 
produce the title deeds to guarantee the validity of the representation of fact by idea.”  Whitehead, 
1978: 54 
iv  See, Ansell-Pearson, 1999: 132 
v  The status of such ‘statements’ shall be taken up later on in this chapter. 
vi  This demonstrates Deleuze’s continuing interest in the relation of philosophy to 
immediate, social concerns from Empiricism and Subjectivity to his later texts; (for example, 
Deleuze, 1991 [1953]: 47). 
vii  This word is over-used but seems pertinent here 
viii  The citation is from Book II, Chapter XXI, Section 1 of Locke’s An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding (Locke, 1988: 105).  In the original the word ‘power’ is in italics on both 
occasions. 
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